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Most economists know about the post World War II economic convergence
among members of the OECD industrialized club. They are less likely toknow
that convergence has been a fact of economic life since the l8SOs (Baumol et
al. ,1989;DeLong, 1988; Williamson, 1992). The experience has been manifested
by three regimes: the late nineteenth century convergence up to 1913; a
cessation of convergence between the start of World War I and the conclusion
of World War II; and the resumption of convergence since. The late nineteenth
century convergence among members of the current OECD club is especially
interesting for three reasons: it was as dramatic as the more recent
experience since 1950; it was manifested primarily by the erosion of gaps
between the New World and the Old, rather than by an erosion of gaps within
either region; and it took place in an environment of relative free factor and
commodity flows.
What role did factor and commodity flows play in contributing to the
economic convergence in the late nineteenth century? If the answer is "big",
can we conclude that the cessation of convergence 1913-1950 and its resumption
since can also be largely explained by those open economy forces?
This paper uses computable general equilibrium models to isolate the
sources of the late nineteenth century economic convergence by assessing the
relative performance of the two most important economies in the Old World and
the New World --Britainand the USA. We attack the problem by identifying
that portion of the factor price convergence which was set in motion by
commodity trade and factor flows, thus emerging with a residual which might beassigned to those forces stressed by Alexander Gerschenkron (1952), Moses
Abramovitz (1986) and the new growth theory. We find that the latter did not
contribute to factor price convergence. The convergence forces that mattered
were commodity market integration, stressed by Eli I-leclcscher and Bertil Ohlin,
and mass migration, stressed by Knut Wicksell. It turns out that offsetting
forces were contributing to late nineteenth century divergence, a finding
consistent with economic history's traditional attention to Britain's alleged
industrial failure (Mccloskey, 1970) and America's spectacular rise to
industrial supremacy (Wright, 1990; Nelson and Wright, 1992).
The paper begins by assessing the impact of the mass migrations
maintaining what might be called Knut Wicksell's (1882) comparative static
assumptions. It then asks which of Wicksell's assumptions are most likely to
have been violated, including the issue of whether capital chased after labor,
an endogenous accumulation response which might have muted the net impact of
the mass migrations on capital-shallowing in the New World and capital-
deepening in the Old. The paper then estimates the impact of Heckscher/Ohlin
trade-related effects, both with and without endogenous migration responses.
We conclude with an overall assessment of the sources of the late nineteenth
century Anglo-American convergence. The conclusion includes an estimate of
residual forces which persist after having taken account of factor flows and
commodity trade, as well as a discussion as to whether these findings are
likely to hold more generally for the full OECD sample.
II. THEIMPACT OF MIGRATION: MAINTAINING WICICSELL' SCLASSICAL ASSUMPTIONS
S
Isinternational migration a good or a bad thing? The debate is at least
2as old as the industrial revolution in Europe, which sent so many emigrants to
the New World in the nineteenth century. As Michael Greenwood and John
McDowell (1986, pp. 1745-7) point out, the debate also has a long history in
the United States, the New World country which absorbed the majority of the
emigrants leaving Europe. It reached a crescendo in 1911 after the Immigration
Commission had pondered the problem for five years. The Commission concluded
it was a bad thing, contributing to poor working conditions, and those
findings helped create the quota legislation implemented in the 1920s. But how
did the Immigration Commission reach its conclusion? For that matter, how do
modern economists reach their conclusions regarding today's migrations?
Like the more general population debate (Kelley, 1988), historical
correlations between migration and real wages are unlikely to offer any clear
answer to the question: Does emigration (immigration) raise (lower) real
wages? After all, immigrants were always pulled into the United States when
the economy was booming for other reasons --e.g.,the 1830s, the late l840s
and 1850s, the late 1860s and early l870s, the 1880s and the l900s. They
avoided the United States when the economy was undergoing macroeconomic bust
and slowdown --e.g.,most of the 1840s, most of the 1870s, and most of the
l890s. Historical correlations like these tell us about immigrant response to
changing labor demand conditions in the United States, not about the
absorption of the immigrants along some stable labor demand curve.
The same can be said for the intertemporal cross-section in Figure 1
where real wages and population growth are plotted for the century 1870-1988.
The evidence presented there surely does not imply that faster immigrant-
augmented population growth raised real wages, but rather that scarce labor
encouraged a supply response. Part of that supply response took the form of
3high fertility and low mortality, and part of it took the form of migration.
Thus, the major emigrating labor abundant countries tend to lie to the left in
the figure while the major immigrating labor scarce countries tend to lie to
the right. Furthermore, a good share of the implied population redistribution
was attributable to migration, especially in the late nineteenth century. Up
to 1913, immigration accounted for 50 percent of Argentina's, and 30 percent
of Australia's population increase (Taylor, 1992, Table 1.1). Between 1870 and
1910, immigration accounted for 28 percent of population increase in the
United States (Easterlin, 1968, p. 189). Between 1871 and 1890, emigration
reduced Swedish population increase by 44 percent (Karistrom, 1985, pp. 155,
181); between 1870 and 1910, it reduced British population increase by 21
percent (Mitchell and Deane, 1962, pp. 9-10); while, based on emigration
rates, even bigger shares must have characterized Ireland, Italy, and Norway.
Furthermore, and as we shall see, since the mass migrations were selective of
young adult males with high labor participation rates, the impact was even
larger on the sending and receiving labor force.
So, by how much did these mass migrations cause real wages in the labor-
abundant Old World to catch up with real wages in the labor-scarce New World?
In the early 1880s, Knut Wicksell, then a relatively young economic theorist
and a neo-Malthusian, asserted that emigration would solve the pauper problem
which blighted labor-abundant and land-scarce Swedish agriculture (Wicksell,
1882; cited in Karistrom, 1985, p. 1). In spite of the intensity of the debate
on the impact of late nineteenth century mass migrations that ensued over the
century since Wicksell wrote, no test of his assertion has been offered.
Furthermore, what literature there is typically asks what the impact on
the receiving (or less frequently, the sending) region was alone, rather than
4asking questions about convergence between them. The difference matters. After
all, if real wages were growing at 2 percent per annum in the labor-scarce
country and 3 percent in the labor-abundant country, and if the 1 percent
difference were attributable entirely to external migration, we might
correctly conclude that migration accounted for only one-quarter of real wage
growth in the labor scarce immigrating country (say, half of the 1 percent,
0.5 percent, divided by 2 percent) and for only one-sixth in the labor
abundant emigrating country (0.5 percent divided by 3 percent), while
incorrectly concluding that migration didn't contribute much to the
(significant) convergence when in fact it accounted for jj of it. The moral
of the story is that we must explore the two regions simultaneously.
The standard way of presenting the problem on the blackboard is
illustrated in Figure 2. New World wages and labor's marginal product are on
the lefthand side and Old World wages and labor's marginal product are on the
righthand side. The world labor supply is measured along the horizontal axis.
An equilibrium distribution of labor, of course, occurs at the intersection of
the two derived labor demand schedules (0 and N). Instead, we start at i
where labor is scarce in the New World, and thus where the wage gap between
the two regions is very large, w' -w01.If "mass" migrations redistribute
labor towards the New World, say to 12, the wage gap collapses to w2 -w02,and
all the observed convergence would be attributable to migration. However,
exactly the same convergence could have been achieved by a relative shift in 0
to 0', an event driven perhaps by relative price shocks favoring labor in the
Old World or by faster accummulation and technological "catching up" there.
Figure 2 is certainly an elegant statement of the question, but how do we
implement the answer empirically?
5The way to proceed, of course, is to develop a model in which the long
run impact of the mass migrations can be assessed. We favor the application of
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, but we are well aware of the
debatable assumptions which may drive the results. That the models focus on
long run supply side forces seems appropriate, but, following Wicksell, we
also assume the absence of scale economies, accumulation responses, and
influences on the rate of technological change. It seems to us sensible to ask
first whether those migrations would have mattered to the evolution of
international wage gaps if standard classical, comparative static assumptions
were approximated by reality. With first order impacts estimated, we can then
explore whether the relaxation of Wicksell's classical assumptions are likely
to overturn our interpretation of history.
While an historical assessment of the impact of the late nineteenth
century mass migrations is our ultimate goal, we begin by reporting in Table 1
the few estimates on sending and receiving regions that have been offered
recently. All of them generate estimates by imposing a no-migration
counterfactual on some CGE model of the sending or receiving region. The two
cases of late nineteenth century mass migration both yield far bigger effects
than that for the Irish immigrations into early nineteenth century Britain:
the emigrations from Sweden in the l870s and 1880s (most of which went to the
US) served to raise real wages there by 4.9 percent per decade; the
immigrations into the United States from 1870 to 1910 (some of whom were
Swedes) served to lower real wages there by 2.5 percent per decade. Swedish
real wages were only 24 percent of United States real wages in 1870, but they
had climbed to 58 percent of the United States by 1913, so that the wage gap
declined by 34 percentage points (Williamson, 1992). According to the rough
6estimates in Table 1, mass migrations served to erode the Swedish-American
wage gap by 9 percentage points, accounting for about a quarter of the
impressive erosion in the Swedish-American wage gap between 1870 and 1913. Had
overseas migration been the only convergence force at work, and had it
continued at the same (enormous) rate, it still would have taken far more than
a century to eliminate the 1870 real wage gap between labor-scarce America and
labor-abundant Sweden. Of course, it would jQhavecontinued at the same
rate: as the wage gap eroded the emigration rate would have declined (Hatton
and Williamson, 1992b), thus extending the point of parity out even further in
time.
This tentative empirical application of classical thinking suggests that
mass migrations made a significant contribution to real wage convergence
between Sweden and America in the late nineteenth century, much like Wicksell
predicted. However, it also suggests that there were other important
convergence forces at work.
The argument can be strengthened by its application to another pair of
countries, the United States and Britain. A recent paper by one of the present
authors (Williamson, 1992) constructed a purchasing-power-parity adjusted
urban unskilled real wage data base for 15 countries over the very long run.
The 1870-1913 evidence is summarized in Figure 3 by a coefficient of
variation, C(15), and it documents considerable convergence. Furthermore, the
late nineteenth century real wage convergence is similar in magnitude to the
better-known convergence after World War II (and a bit bigger than the
convergence implied by per capita income data: Williamson, 1992). Perhaps most
interesting, however, is the finding that most of the late nineteenth century
real wage convergence can be attributed to an erosion in the real wage gap
7between the Old and New World (Dno in Figure 3), and not to any significant
convergence within the Old World (Do) or within the New (Dn). Around 1870,
real wages in the labor scarce New World (Argentina, Australia, Canada and the
USA) were much higher than in the labor abundant Old World (Ireland, Great
Britain; Denmark, Norway, Sweden; Germany; Belgium, Netherlands, France; Italy
and Spain), 136 percent higher. By 1895, real wages in the New World were
"only" 100 percent higher, and in 1913 they were "only" about 87 percent
higher. In short, the real wage gap between Old World and New fell 36
percentage points over the twenty-five years up to 1895, and by 49 percentage
points over the forty-three years up to 1913. The Old World caught up quite a
bit with the New. While the magnitudes were less dramatic, what was true of
Old and New World was also true of two of the most important members in each:
in 1870, real wages in the USA were 66.7 percent higher than in Britain while
in 1890 they were "only" 49.5 percent higher, in 1895 44 percent higher, in
1910 61.9 percent higher, and in 1913 54 percent higher. Thus, the Anglo-
American real wage gap fell by 17.2 percentage points over the twenty years up
to 1890, by 4.8 percentage points over the forty years up to 1910, and by 13
percentage points over the forty-three years up to 1913. Britain caught up a
bit with the United States, a surprising finding given all that has been said
about Britain losing her leadership to America. It must be said, however, that
li of the British catch up took place prior to 1895, not afterwards, when
American industrial ascendancy was most dramatic (e.g., see Wright, 1990). We
shall have more to say about these two regimes below.
We now ask: How much of the Anglo-American real wage convergence after
1870 can be explained by total British net emigration and total American net
immigration? The open, multi-sector British and American GOEs are described in
8Appendix 1, but they are in the classical, comparative static tradition:in
the counterfactual experiment, land, capital and technologies are, at least
initially, kept fixed; only labor is allowed to vary in the no-American-
immigration and no-British-emigration counterfactuals. The US labor force
would have been about 13 percent smaller in 1890 without the net immigrations
1870-1890, and about 27 percent smaller in 1910 without the net immigrations
1870-1910. The British labor force would have been about 11 percent larger in
1890 without the net emigrations 1870-1890, and about 16 percent larger in
1910 without the net emigrations 1870-1910. (Appendix 2. All of these
calculations include the influence of migrant children born after the move. If
the children of the migrants are ignored, the 1910 US labor force would have
been about 18 percent smaller in the absence of immigration, not 27 percent;
and the 1910 British labor force would have been 10 percent larger in the
absence of emigrants, not 11 percent.)
What would have been the impact on these two economies had these
migrations not taken place? The results are presented in Panel A of Table 2,
and they are very big. In 1910, real wages would have been 34 percent higher
in the US and 12.2 percent lower in Britain. American real wage rates were
actually about 61.9 percent higher than British in 1910; without the late
nineteenth century migrations they would have been about 147 percent higher.
The Anglo-American real wage gap fell between 1870 and 1910; without the late
nineteenth century migrations it would have more than doubled!
There would have been no Anglo-American convergence without international
migration. Wicksell's classical assumptions suggest that overseas migrations
made a central contribution to factor price convergence between Old World and
New in the late nineteenth century.
9III. RELAXING WICKSELL'S LASSIAL ASSUMPTIONS
Optimists in the migration debate would, no doubt, argue that the
classical assumptions made thus far overstate the impact of the late
nineteenth century mass migrations. What follows is a list of the ones which,
we suspect, the optimists would stress.
First, we have assumed that labor is homogeneous: natives and migrants
are taken to be unskilled, and they compete for the same jobs. In contrast,
economists assessing postwar American experience with immigration tend to view
migrants and natives more as complements (see the summaries in Simon, 1989,
and Borjas, 1990). While two of us have offered argument elsewhere as to why
the modern complementarity position should be viewed with skepticism (Hatton
and Williamson, 1992a), and while more recent research on post-World War II
American experience confirms that skepticism (orjas and Freeman, 1992), there
is reason in any case to think that conditions were quite different a century
ago. After all, skilled labor was a much smaller share of the labor force in
both sending and receiving regions in the late nineteenth century than it is
now; skills (post-literacy formal education in particular) were much less
important to 1890 technologies than they are to 1990 technologies.
Furthermore, human capital gaps between migrants and native born were much
smaller than they are today (especially in the l980s: Borjas, 1991), and there
is very little evidence to suggest that foreign labor entered segmented
occupations or lacked mobility. Substitutability is far more likely to have
characterized labor markets in the late nineteenth century than
complementarity: new emigrants competed directly with the native-born and old
emigrants at the bottom end of the labor market. Claudia Goldin (1993) has
10recently offered some American evidence from the turn of the century whichis
consistent with our view.
Second, the optimistic view argues that migrants contribute to a demand
boom. This view was certainly dominant in the historical literature of the
1950s and 1960s when Keynesian thinking was in vogue (Thomas, 1954; Easterlin,
1968; Abramovitz, 1961, 1968). A modern version has recently been offered to
account for the view that immigrants never robbed jobs from Australians in the
past (Pope and Withers, 1990). While this view might be credible inthe short
run, it is very unlikely, in our view, to be credible for periods spanning as
much as forty years.
Third, the optimistic view stresses increasing returns, and it is now
firmly mbedded in the new growth theory (Romer, 1986). In spite of all that
has been said about increasing returns, however, there has been no persuasive
evidence offered to confirm it for the nineteenth century.
Fourth, there is what American economic historians call the Walker Effect
(Neal and Uselding, 1972). The argument is that had American labor been even
more scarce in the absence of the immigrants, native fertility rates would
have risen to take up the slack. Since real wage trends explain so little of
New World experience with fertility changes (Lindert, 1978), it seems unlikely
that a native fertility response would have mattered much in muting the impact
of the mass migrations. This is not to say that Old World demographic forces
had no influence on emigration. Indeed, Hatton and Williamson (l992b) have
shown that demographic booms and busts had a powerful effect on European mass
emigrations. Rather, we are saying that real wage changes had only a modest
impact on fertility.
Finally, there are the more conventional accumulation and comparative
11advantage responses to consider. Might there have been immigrant-induced long
run supply-side responses which simultaneously shifted the labor demand curve
to the right just when immigrant-induced rightward shifts in labor supply were
taking place? We find these arguments more compelling, and the sections
following will explore them at length.
IV.DID CAPITAL CHASE AlTERLABOR MU) DID IT MATTER?
In the simple two-factor model, labor should migrate from the low-wage to
the high-wage country, and capital should migrate from the high-wage (low
returns) to the low-wage (high-returns) country. The better integrated are
world capital markets, the faster the real wage convergence. And if world
capital markets become better integrated over time, the rate of convergence
should accelerate, and if world factor markets break down, convergence should
slow down.
Crude correlations would appear to be consistent with these predictions.
After all, there was dramatic real wage convergence during the second half of
the nineteenth century, trends which appear to track evolving world capital
market integration. The size of the international capital flows was very
large, with Britain at the center (Edelstein, 1982). Furthermore, there is
evidence that world capital markets were at least as well integrated around
1890 as they were around 1980 (Zevin, 1992). In addition, real wage
convergence ceased from the start of World War I to the end of World War II,
three decades during which global capital markets collapsed.
Crude correlations may be misleading, however, since the two-factor model
is an inadequate characterization of late nineteenth century history. What
12really distinguished the Old World from the New was natural resource
endowment, and that fact motivates the concept of New World "dual scarcity"
(Temin, 1966). Resources were abundant there, while both capital and labor
were scarce. And there is plenty of evidence that capital and labor moved
together as a consequence: that is, labor emigrated from capital exporting Old
World countries (like Britain, Germany and France) and labor immigrated into
capital importing New tJorld countries (like Argentina, Australia, Canada and
the USA).
If capital and labor moved together, can it still be said that the
overseas mass migrations really contributed to Anglo-America real wage
convergence? We need to know whether the international flow of labor
dominated the flow of capital. If it did, then it served to lower the capital-
labor ratio in America compared with Britain, thus contributing to wage
convergence. Given the impressive size of the literature on late nineteenth
century capital flows and mass migrations, one would have thought it would be
a simple matter to find evidence assessing the net impact of both flows on
capital-labor ratios in the sending Old World and the receiving New World. We
are unaware of any such estimates, however. Capital-deepening over time can be
written as d(K/L) =(K/L)*([dlCD/K
-dLD/L]+[NFl/K
-MIG/L]).The first term
on the right-hand side of this expression refers to domestic and the second to
foreign sources of capital-deepening (NFl is equal to the current account
balance and MIG is equal to net migration). It is the second term which
interests us, and Table 3 offers some evidence for the labor and capital
importing United States and labor and capital exporting Britain.
Labor migration clearly dominated capital migration in the United States
between 1870 and 1910: while foreign capital imports served on average to
13raise the rate of accumulation by a trivial amount over the four decades as a
whole, 0.03 percent per annum, foreign immigration tended to raise the rate of
labor force growth by a lot, 0.82 percent per annum. In combination,
international factor flows served to lower the rate of capital-deepening in
the US by 0.79 percentage points per annum (col. 3, 1870-1910): external
factor flows into the United States cut the rate of capital-deepening by more
than a quarter (-.79/[2.02+.79]= -0.28).
Britain, however, appears to offer a different story. Table 3 suggests
that British capital moved with labor in such massive amounts that
international factor migration must have inhibited convergence: emigration
served to lower the rate of labor force growth in Britain by about 0.38 per
annum between 1870 and 1910, but capital exports served to lower the rate of
accumulation by far more, 2.15 percent per annum. External factor flows did
not raise the rate of éapital-deepening in Britain, but rather lowered it by
1.77 percent per annum (col. 3, 1870-1910): according to this calculation,
British export of capital and labor served to cut the rate of capital-
deepening by almost three-quarters (-l.77/[0.68+l.77])= -0.72). Thus, British
factor exports could not have contributed to Anglo-American real wage
convergence in the late nineteenth century.
Yet, while capital was exiting Britain faster than was labor, how much of
it was actually chasing after labor? The answer is illusive, but we can take a
crude cut at the problem by identifying the direction of the flows. Almost all
British emigrants went to North America, Australia and New Zealand, but only
45 percent of her capital exports went to the same regions (Simon, 1967).
Thus, the "chasing" component of British capital exports cannot have reduced
the rate of capital accumulation by more than about 1 percentage point per
14annum (0.45x-2.l5= -0.97), thus reducing the measured impact on capital-
deepening to 0.59 percent per annum. Even then, we do not know how much of the
British capital exports to North America, Australia and New Zealand was
actually chasing after that labor, and how much of it was responding to third
factors.
Although the phrase "capital chased after labor" has been frequently used
to describe overseas settlement in the late nineteenth century, third factors
surely helped pull both of them abroad. To estimate the impact of labor
migration on real wage convergence, we need to identify that share of British
capital flowing to the New World which was chasing after labor. We cannot. But
we can place an upper bound on the estimate by exploring a second question:
What happens in the no-migration counterfactual reported in Table 2 when
capital is allowed to chase after labor, that is, when world capital markets
are treated as perfectly integrated? Panel B supplies the answer. But before
we look at Panel B, note in Panel A the impact on the return to capital in the
no-migration counterfactual when international capital is assumed immobile.
The capital-labor ratio rises (falls) in the United States (Great Britain) so
the return to capital falls (rises). Thus, if capital is now allowed to be
perfectly mobile, some of it will retreat from America and stay home in
Britain, muting the impact of migration's effects. Now look at Panel B: in
this no-migration counterfactual, 1910 real wages would have been 9.2 percent
higher in the US and 6.6 percent lower in Britain. American real wages were
actually 61.9 percent higher than in Britain in 1910; without the late
nineteenth century migrations, without that part of the capital flows that
15chased after the migrants', the American real wage advantage would have been
even higher, 89.3 percent; furthermore, there would have been no Anglo-
American real wage convergence in the late nineteenth century, since the 1870
American real wage advantage of 66.7 percent would have risen to 89.3 percent
by the end of the period.
The moral of the story is that international migration contributed to
Anglo-American real wage convergence even if we allow for perfect capital
market integration and thus for an elastic accumulation response. The central
reason why these results are so robust is, of course, the presence of an
important third factor in the late nineteenth century, natural resources.
V. WHAT ABOUTCOMMODITY MARKETS AND THE FACTOR-PRICE-EQUALIZATIONTHEOREM?
Ever since Eli Heckscher and Bertil Oblin made their pioneering
contributions shortly after World War I, trade theorists have understood that
real wage convergence can take place in the absence of international
migrations: commodity trade can, at least in theory, serve as substitute for
labor migration. What role did the integration of international commodity
markets play in forging a global labor market and contributing to real wage
convergence? In spite of the importance this issue has played in the trade
literature, until recently (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1992; O'Rourke, Taylor
'The no-migration simulations in Panel B of Table 2 assume a perfectly
elastic external capital supply, an extreme assumption of course. But it does
offer an upper bound on the capital that might have chased after labor in the
late nineteenth century. The simulations imply the following magnitudes: had
capital not chased after the immigrants entering the USA between 1870 and
1910, the rate of accumulation in the USA would have been lower by 0.70
percent per annum; and had capital not chased after the emigrants leaving
Britain between 1870 and 1910, the rate of accumulation in Britain would have
been higher by 0.25 percent per annum.
16and Williamson, 1993) no one has explored its empirical relevance for the late
nineteenth century, the period that motivated Heckscher and Ohlin in the first
place.2
The factor-price-equalization (FPE) theorem has been a durable tool in
trade theory for seventy years. The I-leckscher-Ohlin paradigm has it that
countries tend to export commodities which use intensively the factors in
which they are well endowed while they tend to import commodities which use
intensively the factors in which they are poorly endowed. Furthermore, it can
be shown under (very) restrictive assumptions that a move from no trade to
free trade can in fact equalize factor prices where wide differences existed
before. Consider this relevant historical example: Let falling transport costs
and declining tariff barriers tend to equalize prices of traded commodities.
Countries will now export more of the goods which exploit their favorable
factor endowment. The demand for the abundant and cheap factor booms while
that for the scarce and expensive factor slumps. Thus, commodity price
convergence tends to produce factor price convergence, although theory is
ambiguous about how much.
When Heckscher was writing in 1919 and Ohlin in 1924, they were motivated
by the commodity price convergence which they thought had taken place between
the Old World and the New in the late nineteenth century (see the new
translation edited by Flam and Flanders, 1991). Their economic metaphor was
driven by primary foodstuffs: what economic historians now call the invasion
of grains from the New World, driven by the sharp decline in transport costs,
served to lower the relative price of grains in the Old World (like Britain)
2This and the following seven paragraphs draw liberally on O'Rourke and
Williamson (1992).
17and raise it in the New World (like America). Britain and the smaller
economies on the continent did not respond to the challenge with tariffs,
although the bigger economies on the continent did (like France, Germany and
Italy: Kindleberger, 1951). What occured in the late nineteenth century was
exactly the kind of exogenous relative price shock which is supposed to set
factor-price convergence in motion. According to the FPE theorem, the invasion
of grains should have tended to raise real wages in America while lowering
them in Britain. Did it?
Actually, there are three questions here, not just one. First, were
factor endowments really the key determinants of trade patterns in the late
nineteenth century? Second, was there pronounced commodity price convergence
in the late nineteenth century? Third, if the first two propositions hold,
did commodity price convergence also make a significant contribution to the
observed real wage convergence?
Consider the first question. Two recent and influential papers by
economic historians have analyzed the determinants of comparative advantage in
British and American manufacturing in the late nineteenth century. Nick Crafts
and Mark Thomas (1986) find support for the Heckscher-ohlin hypothesis, since
endowments explain the pattern of trade in British manufacturing between 1910
and 1935, as well as the United States in 1909. Gavin Wright (1990) finds the
same in accounting for the evolution of US trade patterns between 1879 and
1940. More recently, Antoni Estevadeordal (1992) has found more support based
on a large sample of 18 countries around 1913. Indeed, the 1913 evidence is
far more supportive of the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis (Estevadeoral, 1992, p.
9) than Edward Leamer (1984) was able to report on post World War II data.
Finally, it seems relevant to note that William Whitney (1968) found no
18evidence of a Leontief Paradox in the US 1899 data.
Consider the second question. Economic historians have long been aware of
the revolutionary decline in transport costs underlying overseas trade in the
late nineteenth century. Douglass North (1958, p. 537) called the deline
'radical" both for railroads and ocean shipping. Since Britain imported
foodstuffs and raw materials, and since these bulk commodities "were
fundamental beneficiaries of the cheapening transport costs" (p. 544), North
thought it was clear that it contributed in Britain to "lower priced
foodstuffs and therefore rising real wages, and to lowering in the cost of
industrial raw materials" (p. 545) and therefore, we take it, rising rates of
industrialization. Although North doesn't say so, symmetry suggests that real
wages must have been lowered in the US while industrialization must have been
suppressed, ceteris Daribus.
When deflated by a general price index, North's freight rate index along
American North Atlantic export routes dropped by more than 41 percent between
1870 and 1910. His wheat-specific American east coast real freight rate index
fell by even more, about 53 percent. Similar evidence has been offered more
recently by Knick Harley (1988), based on British overseas coal freight rates.
Meanwhile, rail rates to the American interior fell, perhaps by even more
(Williamson, 1974, p. 282).
In assessing the radical decline in overseas freight rates and the cost
reductions along the rails between Chicago and New York, what mattered, of
course, was its impact on the price convergence of tradables. Almost without
exception, the literature has explored the question by looking at the
international grain market. This is certainly true of Charles Kindleberger's
(1951) important contribution to the debate over the Old World defensive
19policy response to the grain invasion, and it is also true of Knick Harley's
(1980, 1986) writings on late nineteenth century transport, trade and
settlement. It turns out, however, that Anglo-American price convergence was
far more comprehensive. A recent paper by two of the present authors has shown
that while Liverpool grain prices exceeded Chicago prices by 60.2 percent in
1870, the spread was only 14.2 percent in 1912 (O'Rourke and Williamson,
1992). The price gap for meat and animal fats declined from 93 percent to 18
percent over the same period. The price gap for iron products fell from 80 to
20 percent, cotton textiles from 14 to 1 percent, and so on. Quite clearly,
there was dramatic convergence of tradable prices in the Atlantic economy
between 1870 and World War I.
Consider now the third question. In an effort to assess the FPE theorem,
the same computable general equilibrium (CCE) models that were used in Section
IV to assess Anglo-American migrations were also used to assess the impact of
price convergence (O'Rourke and Williamson, l992). The first results, which
do not allow for any external capital flow response, are summarized in Panel A
of Table 4. The table offers estimates of the impact of commodity price
convergence on Anglo-American real wages and other factor prices for both the
earlier 1870-1890 period as well as the full 1870-1910 period. Our interest
here is itt the real wage gap. The Anglo-American real wage gap declined in
fact by 17.2 percentage points up to 1890. Table 4 (Panel A) implies that
about two-thirds of that convergence can be assigned to commodity price
equalization forces, about 12.2 percentage points. Over the full period 1870-
1910, it served to reduce the wage gap by about 26.6 percentage points, a
The analysis which follows has also been confirmed by applying
econometrics to a seven-country panel data set for the late 19th century
(O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, 1993).
20figure which exceeds the actual measured convergence over the four decades as
a whole suggesting that the effects of the superior American industrial
performance was dominant after 1890 (consistent with Wright, 1990). In short,
commodity price convergence played a significant role in contributing to real
wage convergence up to 1890, and in muting the divergence effects of superior
American industrialization thereafter.
Note, in addition, that commodity price convergence served to erode
relative capital scarcity in America. Compared with the rest of the economy,
agriculture was less capital intensive in both America and Britain. Thus, the
price shocks served to lower the return to capital in America (where, in
response, the relative size of agriculture rose) and to raise it in Britain
(where, in response, the relative size of agriculture fell). On net, commodity
price convergence served to erode the rate of return gap (which favored
capital-scarce America). These results suggest that if world capital markets
had been perfectly integrated, commodity price convergence would have served
by itself to accelerate accumulation in Britain relative to America, to
increase the capital-labor ratio in Britain relative to America, thus to
reinforce real wage convergence. Panel B of Table 4 suggests, however, that
such supportive accumulation responses would have had only a modest impact: an
(extreme) assumption of perfectly elastic world capital flows in response to
the price shocks implies that induced real wage convergence up to 1910 would
have been 31.5 percentage points (perfectly elastic capital flows) rather than
26.6 percentage points (no capital flows).' Thus, our results are robust to
'The induced external capital flows underlying the simulations in Panel B
of Table 4 for the full 1870-1910 period have a trivial impact on the rate of
accumulation in the USA while they only increase the rate of accumulation in
Britain by about 0.2 percent per annum. These are upper bounds on the
estimated capital migration response to the Anglo-American commodity price
21assumptions about world capital markets, at least in terms of the FPE theorem.
VI.ENDOGENIZINGMIGRATION
The previous section shows that Hecjcscher and Ohlin were right: commodity
price convergence served to erase some of the Anglo-American wage gap in the
late nineteenth century. But we should remember that international trade and
labor migrations are partial substitutes: if commodity price convergence
served to erase part of the Anglo-American wage gap, then it should also have
diminished the size of the mass migrations. In short, by failing to allow
migration to respond to Anglo-American wage gaps, we have overstated the net
impact of commodity price convergence. The interesting question, of course, is
"how much?" This section offers an answer by endogenizing United States
immigration and British emigration.
We rely on two studies which have estimated US immigrant (Williamson,
1974, p. 236) and British emigrant (Hatton, 1992) elasticities in response to
changes in home wages, and when embedded in the model they convert migrant
elasticities to migrant-induced labor force elasticities.
A comparison of Panel C with Panel A of Table 4 shows how little
endogenous migration responses diminish the net impact of commodity price
convergence. This, of course, does not imply that migration had a weak impact
on real wage convergence since, indeed, Table 2 has already shown the
contrary. Rather, it simply suggests that the endogenous migrant-induced labor
force responses to these price shocks were modest.
convergence, so they give some sense of the small interaction between global
commodity and capital markets implied by the experiments.
22VII. WHAT EXPLATNSTHELATE NINETEENTH ANGLO-AMERICAN CONVERGENCE?
Factorprices converged among the currently-industrialized OECD countries
between 1870 and World War I. It was manifested in relatives --the
wage/rental ratio --andin absolutes --thereal wage. The convergence was as
dramatic as it has been in the more familiar post-World War II decades.
Furthermore, the convergence was driven primarily by the erosion of the
average wage gap between the New World and the Old, rather than by convergence
within either of the two regions. While the real wage convergence between the
resource-rich and labor-scarce United States and resource-poor and labor-
abundant Britain was far less spectacular than was true for the rest of the
OEGD sample, and while it was far greater in the first half than in the second
half of the period, some Anglo-American convergence did take place.
How much of the Anglo-American convergence in the late nineteenth century
was due to the mass migrations? How much of it was due to commodity price
convergence? And how much of it to the residual forces of resource
accumulation and productivity advance? Table 5 offers our tenative answers.
The first row reports the observed real wage convergence, the US losing some
of its real wage advantage between 1870 and 1890, while recovering most of
that lost ground between 1890 and 1910. The second row reports the independent
impact of US immigrations and British emigrations on the Anglo-American wage
gap, netting out the influence of endogenous external capital flows, that is,
netting out the fact that capital chased after labor (from Table 2, Panel B).
Row 2 offers a lower bound of the impact of the mass migrations since it makes
the extreme assumption of perfectly elastic capital flow responses to rate of
return differentials in the two economies. The third row reports the impact of
23these commodity price convergence factors were weaker for many other European
trading partners (due, of course, to protection: O'Rourke, Taylor and
Williamson, 1993). "Yes" in the sense that Old World mass emigrations were
even bigger in Ireland, Italy and Norway than in Britain, and in the sense
that New World mass immigrations were even bigger in Argentina and Canada than
in the USA. "Maybe" in the sense that those residual factors were likely to
have favored convergence for other pairs of countries, poor countries catching
up technologically with the rich. What we need, of course, are more studies
like this one to find out whether the late nineteenth century Anglo-American
convergence forces were replicated at the global level.
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Three Estimates of the Impact of 19th Century International





Impact on Real Wages Source Total per Decade
Emigration Sweden 1871—90 +9.4% +4.9% Karistrom(1985),p.155
Immigration Britain 1821—51 —4.1 —1.4 Williamson(1990J,p.153

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impact of International Migration and Capital Flows
on Capital-Deepening in Britain and America, 1870-1910:
per annum growth (in percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country and
Period NFl/K MIG/L Actual K/L
United States
1870-1890 0.40 0.69 -0.29 1.96
1890-1910 -0.09 0.94 -1.03 2.08
1870-1910 0.03 0.82 -0.79 2.02
Great Britain
1870-1890 -2.23 -0.52 -1.71 0.53
1890-1910 -2.14 -0.24 -1.90 0.82
1870-1910 -2.15 -0.38 -1.77 0.68
Sources and notes.
(1) United States: NFl =netforeign investment (+ inflow, -outflow,
current $: US Bureau of the Census, 1975, series Ul8-U24, pp. 867-8); K =net
reproducible capital stock (current $:Kendrick,1961, Tables A-KY and A-XVI,
pp. 320-4 for constant $; Kendrick, 1961, Tables A-ha and A-JIb, pp. 293-297,
for prices to convert to current $).GreatBritain: NFl =netforeign
investment (current £s: Edeisteiri, 1982, Table A1.1, pp. 313-4); K =net
reproducible capital stock (current £s: Feinstein, 1976, Table 46, pp. T103-
T104).
(2) United States and Great Britain: MIG/L is the estimated impact of
migrants and their children on the labor force (Appendix 2).
(4) United States: reproducible capital stock in 1929 prices (Kendrick,
1961, Tables A-KY and A-XVI, pp. 320-324; labor force from Appendix 2. Great
Britain: reproducible capital stock in 1900 prices (Feinstein, 1976, Table 43,
pp. T96-T97); labor force from Appendix 2.
Wolff (1991, p. 571) estimates a rate of British capital-deepening of 0.83
for the period 1880-1913 (compared with our estimate of 0.68 for 1870-1910)
and a rate of American capital-deepening of 2.61 for the period 1880-1913
(compared with our estimate of 2.02 for 1870-1910).Table 4
Counterfactual: Did Anglo-imerican Commodity Price Equalization







Panel A: Without International Capital Flows
Early Period: 1870—1890
Urban real wage +0.1 +8.0 +7.9
Land real rent +3.5 —26.0 —29.5
Return to capital —2.4 +7.5 +9.9
Wage rental ratio —3.3 +45.9 +49.2
Full period: 1870—1910
Urban real wage +0.3 +19.3 +19.0
Land real rent +11.5 —50.7 —62.2
Return to capital —7.9 +18.4 +26.3
Wage rental ratio —10.1 +142.1 +152.2
PANEL B: With Perfectly Elastic International Capital Flows
Early period: 1870—1890
Urban real wage +1.0 +11.1 +10.].
Land real rent +3.7 —26.0 —29.7
Wage rental ratio —2.6 +50.1 +52.7
Full period: 1870—1910
Urban real wage +1.7 +25.4 +23.7
Land real rent +11.8 —50.7 —62.5
Wage rental ratio —9.1 +154.5 +163.6
PANEL C: With Endogenous International Migration Responses
Early Period: 1870—1890
Urban real wage +0.1 +6.2 +6.1
Land real rent +3.5 —25.7 —29.2
Return to capital —2.4 +10.8 +13.2
Wage rental ratio —3.3 +43.0 +46.3
Full period: 1870—1910
Urban real wage +0.2 +13.7 +13.5
Land real rent +11.6 —50.1 —61.7
Return to capital —7.8 +28.8 +36.6
Wage rental ratio —10.2 +128.0 +138.2
Source: panel A and B are revisions of O'Rourke and Williamson [1992], Tables
2 and 3. Panel C is calculated by endogenizing migration.Table 5
The Sources of Late Nineteenth Century Anglo-American
Real Wage Convergence: Wage Cap (in percent)
Source 1870 1890 1910
1.Wage gap trend observed
(Williamson, 1992, Table A2)
66.7% 49.5% 61.9%
Due to:
2.Post-1870 labor migration, net
of capital flow response
(Table 2, Panel B)
66.7 53.3 42.0
3.Post-1870 commodity price
convergence, net of capital
flow and migration response
(Table 4, Panel C)
66.7 51.6 35.2
4.Both (2) and (3) 66.7 39.4 15.1





Notes: Row (1) reports the percent by which real wage rates in the USA
exceeded Britain in 1870, 1890 and 1910. Row (2) can be illustrated by the
1890 calculation: since Table 2, Panel B, reports that the US wage rate would
have increased by 3.7 percent in the absence of immigration (to 172.9 =
1.037x166.7),it follows that immigration by itself served to reduce the US
real wage. rate by 3.6 percent ([166.7 -172.9}/172.9=-.036),that is from
166.7 (Britain =100)in 1870 to 160.7 in 1890 (=.964x166.7); since Table 2,
Panel B, reports that the British wage rate would have decreased by 4.7
percent in the absence of emigration (to 95.3 =.953xl00),it follows that
emigration by itself served to raise the British real wage rate by 4.9 percent
([100 -95.3]/95.3+.049), that is from 100 in 1870 to 104.9 in 1890; thus,
migration by itself served to reduce the wage gap from 66.7 percent in 1870 to
53.2 percent in 1890 ([160.7 -104.9}/l04.9=.532).Row (3) can also be
illustrated by the 1890 calculation: Table 4, Panel C, reports that the US
wage rate was increased by 0.1 percent by commodity price convergence to 166.9
in 1890 (l66.7x1.00l =166.9);Table 4, Panel C, reports that the British wage
rate was increased by 6.2 percent to 106.2 in 1890; thus, commodity price
convergence by itself served to reduce the wage gap from 66.7 percent in 1870
to 57.2 percent in 1890 ([166.9-106.2]/l06.2 =.572).Row (4) multiplies the
two effects in Rows 2 and 3: due to these two forces, the US real wage rate inNotes to Table 5 (continued):
1890 would have been 160.9 (=.964xl.O01xl66.7)the British real wage rate
would have been 111.4 (=l.049x1.062x100),and the wage gap would have been
44.4 percent ([160.9 -111.41/111.4 =.444).Row (5) calculates the residual:
Row (1) reports that the US realwage rate fell (relative to Britain =100)
from 166.7 to 149.5 between 1870 and 1890, 17.2points, while migration and
commodity price convergence pushed it down from 166.7 to 160.9, 5.8points,
for a residual of 11.4 points, or to 155.3 in 1890(166.7 -11.4=155.3);
since the British real wage rate is taken as thebase, it stays at 100, Row
(4) reports that migration and commodity priceconvergence pushed up the
British real wage rate from 100 to 111.4, 11.4 points, fora residual of -11.4
points, or 88.6 in 1890; thus, residual forces served to raise thewage gap





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Appendix 1: The CGE Models in Detail
While they are very similar, the US model is more complicated than the
British in several ways. This appendix will therefore explain the former in
some detail (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1992). The major simplifications made
to the latter are then indicated; the text and the US model exposition here
should make the structure of the British model clear.
The US Model
The US model is in the neoclassical, general equilibrium tradition. It
has three components. Sector supplies obey standard production functions;
output and factor prices are endogenously determined. Each commodity has a
price, which may or may not be endogenous, depending on whether the good is
tradable in world markets. Consumers are constrained by endowments and
maximize some utility function; their income and expenditures are endogenous.
The alogrithm used here, MPS\GE, is taken from Rutherford (1988).
Production and utility functions are specified; the algorithm then calculates
cost, factor demand and commodity demand. Equilibrium is defined by a set of
prices, activity levels and incomes such that: (i) no sector earns a positive
profit; (ii) supply minus demand for each commodity is nonnegative; and (UI)
income from factor endowments is fully distributed.
Production
There are four production activities: food (A); agricultural
intermediates (I); non—food manufacturing (MA); and services (5). In addition
to the four commodities produced, there are three primary factors of
production —-land(R), raw labor (LR) and capital (K); two 'produced' factorsof production ——agriculturallabor (LA) and non—agricultural labor (LNA); and
two imported goods ——tropicalgoods (T) and imported manufactures (M1,).
Finally, an artificial good, 'foreign exchange', is used in modelling trade
flows, and serves as the numeraire.
MPS\GE insists that production functions be C.E.S., of which cobb—
Douglas is a special case.(Given the elasticity of substitution, all the
parameters of such functions can be conveniently estimated from a micro—
consistent data set.) Production in both agricultural sectors is cobb—
Douglas, production in the other two sectors C.E.S.:
A—L GALKQAXROAR 1 —
AAA A
:t —LeILK OIKR sIR 2 —Al II ()
MA =(aMLLNmtM+aMKKN+aMIIM+ aTMtM + aMAMIU (3)
S =(asL+ aSKKS+ aSMMAS]' (4)
where the left—hand side variables are outputs, X1 is the input of commodity X




where the a's are pairwise elasticities of substitution.
Firmsminimizecosts, which generates factor demand and cost functions.
In the Cobb—Douglas case, where Q is output, X1 is the input of factor i, and
is the price of factor i, production is described by (choosing units so
that the constant term is unity)
Q = (7)
the demand for factor i equals
Q) =Q(O1/w1)E1(w/$)0 (8)
and the cost function is given by (where B is a constant)c({w1}, Q) =BQE1(w1/®1)®' (9)
In the more general C.E.S. case, production is given by
fl= r.a.x.tiHt '10 L1l1J
wherei-= (a—1)/a,and factor demands are given by
Q)= Q((a1/w1){E(a0w10)}hh'0]0 (11)
and the cost function is
c({w1}, Q) =Q(E1(w1/a1)1°J111° (12)
The model assumes perfect competition; thus, in each sector price equals
unit cost (which depends uniquely on factor prices, given constant returns to
scale):
—cA(wA,r, d) (13)
p1 =cI(wA,r, d) (14)
=c(w,r, T' PA) (15)
=cs(WNA,r, p) (16)
Here p1 stands for the price of good i; wA and are the wages of
agricultural and non—agricultural labor respectively; r and d are the returns
to capital and land respectively; and the c1 functions are unit cost functions
as in (9) and (12) above.
Equations (13) through (16) incorporate the model's assumptions about
factor mobility across sectors, Capital is perfectly mobile across all
sectors. Land and agricultural labor are perfectly mobile between A and I.
Non—agricultural labor is perfectly mobile between manufacturing and services.
Labor is, however, imperfectly mobile between agriculture and the rest of the
economy.
Rural-Urban Migration
By allowing labor be less than perfectly mobile between sectors, rural—urban wage gaps are determined endogenously.Workers are endowed with 'raw'
labor, which, by their migration decisions, is then transformed into
agricultural and non—agricultural labor via a pseudo—production function, (LA,




whereL.a is the fixed endowment of raw labor, and p is the constant elasticity
of transformation of this joint production function, which determines how
sensitive the intersectoral. allocation of labor is to changes in the urban—
rural wage gap. Their solution to this problem is:
LA =LR(wA/aArltL;LNA = (17)
where r =(6AAI'+ 6NA'tFNAP1
Since the worker is endowed with raw labor, we need to determine the
price of raw labor, wR; given WA and wNA (and hence, via (17), LA and LNA), we
can calculate it from the zero—profit condition in the migration 'sector':
wRLR =WALA+wNALNA (18)
Trade Flows
Pseudo—production functions are also used to model trade flows. Export
sectors convert the export good into foreign exchange, and import sectors
convert foreign exchange into import goods. In the benchmark equilibrium, the
US ran a trade deficit. The US consumer is therefore endowed with enough
foreign exchange to allow her to finance this deficit. This (together with
the assumption that 'foreign exchange' is the numeraire) amounts to assuming
that the nominal trade deficit is exogenous. This is of course
unsatisfactory; but it is no more convincing to assume, for example, that
trade is always balanced, or that the real value of the deficit is exogenous.As is well known, an intertemporal model would be required to model the
current account rigorously; in the context of a static model, some ad hoc
assumption is required.
The US is assumed to be 'small' in the markets for food, foreign
manufactures and tropical goods; thus prices are exogenous. This is modelled
by allowing exports or imports to be converted into foreign exchange at a
fixed ratio. Let and stand for exports and imports of good i
respectively, and let F1 denote the amount of foreign exchange used as an




Tropical good imports I-i.
The price—cost equations for these three sectors tie down the exogenous
prices of these three goods; it remains to determine the level of exports or
imports of the goods.
The US is assumed to be 'big' in cotton, so cotton exports cannot be
modelled in this way. The more cotton the US exports, the lower will be the
price of cotton. Thus, the production function converting cotton exports into
foreign exchange will exhibit decreasing rather than constant returns to
scale. This fact is incorporated in the following way:
F1 =7azl.a (19)
where A is a constant and Z is a fictitious factor of production. The factor
is in fixed supply, which is what generates the decreasing returns to scale,
By 'minimizing costs' in this sector, a constant elasticity foreign demand forUS cotton is generated:
Cp1/ (20)
where C is a constant,is the elasticity of demand and IE is the price of
US cotton abroad. Transport costs in this sector are explicitly modelled by
assuming that they act as a tax t on exports, the revenue from which accrues
to the US consumer (that is, we assume that shipping receipts went to US
nationals). The domestic and foreign price of intermediates are, of course,
related as follows:
IE =p1(l+t) (21)
Finally, services are non—traded; domestic demand equals domestic
supply.
Demand
The representative consumer is endowed with raw labor, capital, and
land. In addition, she is endowed with enough foreign exchange to run the
exogenous trade deficit, and she consumes manufactured goods (both foreign and
domestic), food, services and tropical goods. She maximizes
U(CM, C51 CA, C1.) =CMeMCSCAeACTeT (22)
subject to Z1p1C1 =Y,where 14 refers to a composite manufactured good. As is




The utility function is, however, nested; at a lower level the consumer
determines how much of the two manufactured goods (home and foreign) to
consume, by solving
max [aAC +aFCMF)s.t. MACMA + PMFCMF = (26)
which yields the following demand functions for manufactured goods:





Equilibrium is defined by the following conditions: for every sector,
price equals cost; for every commodity, demand equals supply; and the
consumer's income equals the rents on all endowments. If there are n sectors
and m commodities, this implies n +m+1equations (and, owing to Walras'
Law, n +mindependent equations), to solve for n +m+1unknowns (n activity
levels, m prices and the consumer's income). Sectors here include those which
transform goods into foreign exchange or vice versa, and that which transforms
raw labor into agricultural and non—agricultural labor.
More concretely, there are 13 prices endogenously determined in terms of
the numeraire (foreign exchange): p, MF' A' T' Z' PpDIE's'WAYWA,WNA,
r, and d. There are 9 activity levels endogenously determined: MA, A, I, 5,
EA, E1, I and that associated with the migration sector. Finally, there
is the income of the representative consumer to determine, making 23
endogenous variables in all.
The following equations are available to solve the model. First, there
are the zero—profit equations for the four production sectors ((13)—(16)].
Second, there is the zero-profit equation for the migration sector [(18)].
Third, there is the equation giving IE in terms of p1 ((21)]. Fourth, there
are the zero—profit conditions for the four trade sectors (three tradeable and




Fifth, there arethefollowing statements that equate demand and supply
(lettingstand for the endowment of factor X):
MA =MAS+ (33)










Finally, there is the equation defining the income of the consumer:
Y =wR+rK+dR+F (44)
where F is the consumer's endowment of the fixed factor.
There are thus these 22 equations, plus the full employment condition
for the fixed factor Z, with which to solve for the 23 unknowns.
The British model
The British model is very similar to the US model, but is considerably
simpler. First, there are only three sectors: agriculture (Cobb—Douglas
production), manufacturing and services (both C.E.S. production). Second,Britain is assumed to be 'small' in world markets for both food and
manufactures; thus these prices are exogenous to the model, and there is no
need to treat foreign demand for either good explicitly, as was the case for
US cotton exports. Third, Britain exports manufactures and imports food (the
opposite from the US case); food is assumed to be a homogenous good, and so
domestic and foreign food do not substitute imperfectly in British consumption
(as do domestic and foreign manufactures in US consumption). The British
utility function is thus assumed to be a single—level Cobb—Douglas function,
whereas the US utility function was a two—level nested function.Appendix Table 1.1
Estimated Factor Intensities: Share of Input Costs
in Gross Output (O)
Industry °L °K 0R 01 0A °T 0M
United Statesc. 1869
0.437 0.052 0.097 0.013 14 0.401
A 0.553 0.213 0.234
I 0.684 0.230 0.086
S 0.718 0.249 0.34
Great Britainc1871
0.240 0.250 14 0.510
A 0.529 0.196 0.275
S 0.491 0.505 0.004






H Added L K R I A T
UnitedStates c. 1869($m.)
805.8 878.7 104.5194.526.4 1684.5 H 2009.9
A 2457.21359.2 522.3575.7 2457.2
I 285.0194.965.624.5
• 285.0
S 2995.92149.7 745.5 100.7 2895.2
Total 7748.04509.6 2212.1600.2104.5194.526.4100.7 7321.9
Britainc. 1871 (em.)
465.5237.3 111.6 116.6 348.9 H
A 130.4 69.025.635.8 130.4
S 399.2196.2. 201.6 1.4 397.8
Total 995.1502.5 338.835.8116.6 1.4 877.1
Source: See text for notation and O'Rourke and Williamson (1992) for sources.
tAppendix 2: Estimating the Contribution of Immigration and Emigration to
the Labor Force in the United States and the United kingdom, 1870-1910
In order to estimate the effect of international migrationspn the labor
force in the Us and the UK 1870-1910, we work from the endyear migrant stocks
reported in censuses as residents born overseas. Using age/sex-specific labor
participation rates, we then estimate what the labor force would have been had
there been n.o international migration after 1870. We prefer this approach to
simply cumulating the migrant flows and subtracting or adding these to the
change in the labor force over the period, since failure to allow for the
death or retirement of migrants would lead to overestimates of the
contribution of migration. Our approach also makes it possible to augment the
estimates to include the impact of children born to migrants after the move.
United States 1870-1910
One of the earliest attempts to make estimates of this sort was by Simon
Kuznets (1952), and for the same period which interests us. Larry Neal and
Paul Uselding (1972) greatly improved on Kuznets' method by using age-specific
death rates to survive the native population backwards, and over a much longer
period. We believe that our estimates are an improvement on both.
We start with the immigrant stock by sex and by eight differentage
groups from the 1910 US Census. We first estimate the proportion in each
age/sex category who are likely to have immigrated before 1870 (based on the
estimated age structure of the immigrants who arrived in the decade of the
l86Os). These are deducted from the 1910 stock. We then apply age/sex-specific
labor participation rates to the remainder, obtaining the total directcontribution of post-1870 immigration to the 1910 labor force.
The next step is to allow for the contribution of the children born in
the US of post-1870 immigrants. To do so, we first take from the 1910 Census
the numbers in each age/sex category whose parents were foreign-born plus half
of those who were of mixed parentage. We then estimate the age of their
parents by adding thirty years to each age group. Using the age structure of
immigration (in the l860s), we deduct the proportion of those children in each
age/sex category whose parents are likely to have immigrated in 1870 or
earlier. Finally, we apply age-specific labor participation rates to obtain
the contribution of the children of post-187O immigrants to the 1910 labor
force.
A similar procedure was followed based on the 1890 Census to estimate the
contribution of immigration since 1870 to the labor force in 1890.
United KinQdom 1871-1911
We are unaware of any previous estimates for the United Kingdom. The
procedure is not unlike that for the United States, except here we first need
to identify the United Kingdom-born residing abroad, and second to apply
United Kingdom labor participation and attitudes to family formation in a
counterfactual world where they would have stayed home.
We first obtain the stock of UK emigrants by sex living in the US,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. These were divided into the
eight age groups: those in the US and Canada based on the age distributionof
all US immgrants in 1910, and those in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
based on the age distribution of UK immigrants in Australia in 1911. We then
estimate the proportion in each age group who are likely to have emigrated1871 or before based on the age structure of immigration flows in the 1860s.
Deducting these from the 1911 stock abroad and applying age/sex-specific labor
participation rates reported in England and Wales in 1911, we arrive at an
estimate of the direct loss from the labor force of post-1871 emigration.
We also need to estimate the reduction in the UK labor force due to the
children that the post-1871 emigrants would have had had they remained in the
UK. We begin by taking the ratios of each age/sex group in the UK in 1911 to
the total population (male and female) thirty years older. We then apply these
ratios to our estimated stock of post-1871 emigrants in 1911 to generate the
number of children they would have had had they remained in the UK. Applying
the 1911 labor participation rates to these numbers gives us our estimate of
the effect of the loss of the emigrants' potential children to the UK labor
force.
A similar procedure was followed based on the UK and overseas censuses
for 1890/91 to estimate the impact of UK emigration after 1871 on the labor
force in 1891.